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WHEN FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
COLLIDE: NEGATIVE POLITICAL

ADVERTISING & THE DEMOBILIZATION
OF DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE
Clay Calvert*
The page-one headline in the May 25, 1996 edition of the San
FranciscoChronicle told a predictable and sad story about the current state of American politics: "Clinton, Dole Ready to Air Attack Ads: Race gets personal earlier than usual."' Writing in the
Washington Post two months later, Howard Kurtz observed that
"the Republican and Democratic national committees have uncorked a series of attack2 ads, often based on highly selective facts
or outright distortions.,
* Assistant Professor of Communications and Associate Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment, Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1991,
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Ph.D., 1996, Communication,
Stanford University.
1. James Bennet, Clinton, Dole Ready to Air Attack Ads: Race Gets Personal
Earlier Than Usual, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 1996, at Al. Both major presidential
candidates used negative attack ads. For example, one advertisement for Republican candidate Robert Dole used grainy, slow-motion footage of President Bill Clinton with a voice-over stating, "Under Clinton, cocaine and heroin use among teenagers has doubled. Why? Because Bill Clinton isn't protecting our children from
drugs.... Clinton's liberal drug policies have failed. Our children deserve better."
Howard Kurtz, Ad Watch: Evaluating the Political Message, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
1996, at A6. President Clinton attacked his opponent in a televised ad with the message: "Bob Dole: $900 billion in higher taxes. Republicans call him tax collector for
the welfare state. His risky tax scheme would raise taxes on nine million families.
Bob Dole. Wrong in the past. Wrong for our future." Howard Kurtz, Ad Watch:
Evaluatingthe PoliticalMessage, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1996, at A12.
2. Howard Kurtz, Presidential Campaign Ads' Pique Season Gets Early Start,
WASH. POST, July 27, 1996, at Al. Negative political ads "are now staples in federal,
state, and local campaigns." KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND,
NEGATIVE POLITICAL ADVERTISING: COMING OF AGE 3 (1991).
Negative advertisements in the 1996 election year, of course, prevailed in
more than just the presidential campaign. For instance, Maria Elena Milton, a
Democratic candidate for the United States House of Representatives and follower
of Lyndon LaRouche, ran televised ads alleging that her opponent "wants to push
your parents into the gas ovens of managed care" and "send your Social Security
crashing into the Everglade swamps." Both Sides Denounce Challenger's Commer-
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The danger posed by televised attack ads3 goes far beyond
polluting the marketplace of ideas with inaccuracies and distortions. New research by scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) and the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA) suggests a more grave threat to the self-governing process. 4 Negative, attack advertising "actually suppresses voter turnout.",5 It "extracts a toll on electoral participation," 6 and political
strategists aware of this phenomenon deliberately use negative
for purposes of "the shrinking of the
campaign advertisements
7
electorate."
cials, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at 18.
The race in Virginia for a spot in the United States Senate included the use
"of a bogus photograph in an attack advertisement ....
." Bogus Photo in Commercial Gives Virginia Senatora Headache, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at 17. The media
consultant for Republican incumbent, John W. Warner, "electronically placed
[opponent] Mark Warner's head onto the body of Senator Charles S. Robb, a Virginia Democrat." Id.
3. Attack ads "are negative in focus and designed to call attention to a candidate's weaknesses (character and/or issue positions)." MICHAEL PFAU & HENRY C.
KENSKI, ATTACK POLITICS: STRATEGY AND DEFENSE 2 (1990). They are "viewed by
many as the electronic equivalent of the plague." DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS:
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 1952-1992, at 51 (1993).
In contrast to negative ads, "[p]ositive messages are designed to promote the
attributes of a candidate's character, positions, and performance in public office."
PFAU & KENSKI, supra, at 2.
4. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How
ATrACK ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995); Stephen Ansolabe-

here & Shanto Iyengar, Winning, but Losing: How Negative Campaigns Shrink
Electorate,Manipulate News Media, QUILL, May 1996, at 19; Stephen Ansolabehere
et al., Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?,88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829
(1994) (concluding that negative campaign advertising dropped intentions to vote by
five percent and weakened voters' sense of political efficacy).
5. ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 9. This finding contradicts the
results of an experiment by a group of Michigan State University researchers who
found that negative and positive political advertisements do not differ in their effect
on voter turnout. See Gina M. Garramone et al., Effects of Negative PoliticalAdvertising on the PoliticalProcess, 34 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 299, 308
(1990). That research, however, was based on a sample of college students as the
experimental subjects, and the candidates featured in the advertisements were not
real. See id. at 302-03. Part II of this Article reviews and critiques experiments and
studies that suggest negative ads suppress voter turnout.
6. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 835. The research suggests that attack
ads "produce the highest drop in political efficacy and in intentions to participate
among nonpartisans." ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 148. Negative
ads divide "the American electorate into a voting public of party loyalists and a nonvoting public of apathetics." Id.
7. ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 9. Signs of disinterest in the
1996 presidential campaign were not hard to find. For instance, 116.8 million fewer
people tuned in to the 1996 televised debates between incumbent William Jefferson
Clinton, and his Republican challenger, former Kansas Senator Robert Dole. See
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Voter turnout is diminishing. The turnout of the voting-age
population in the 1996 presidential election was about 49%, less
than half of all potential voters and the lowest figure since 1924.8
Voter turnout for the presidential election in 1988 was just 50.1%
of the voting-age population.9 Although the figure was a slightly
higher 55.2% in 1992, this is still far less than voter turnout during
the elections of 1960, 1964, and 1968, each of which topped more
than 60%." There has been, writes Columbia University communication scholar James W. Carey, a steady "evacuation of the public realm."'" The new data suggest that negative advertising plays a
Heather Fleming, One Debate Issue Settled: Ratings Down, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Oct. 21, 1996, at 18.
8. See Eric Schmitt, The Voters: Halfthe Electorate, PerhapsSatisfied or Bored,
Sat Out Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B6. The decrease in voter turnout is
especially troubling because registration is probably at its highest level since 1968.
See id. To put the voting figures into perspective, more people-about 95 millionwatched on television the slow-speed pursuit of O.J. Simpson in the white Bronco
during the summer of 1994 than voted-about 92.8 million-in the 1996 presidential
election. See David Cay Johnston, Voting, America's Not Keen On. Coffee Is Another Matter., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at 2. Likewise, more Americans brew a cup
of coffee each day-about 94 million people-than voted in the 1996 presidential
election. See id.
9. See Jon R. Sinclair, Reforming Television's Role in American Political Campaigns: Rationalefor the Elimination of Paid PoliticalAdvertisements, COMM. & L.,
Mar. 1995, at 65, 84. It should be noted that the 1980s was an era of "explosive
growth in attack politics." PFAU & KENSKI, supra note 3, at 13. The 1988 presidential election, in particular, brought "the extensive use of attack politics within both
political parties in the presidential nomination contests and the early and widespread
use of negative messages in the presidential race as well." Id. at 39. As Adam Nagourney writes, the "conventional wisdom" is that "the 1988 presidential election
was the one that pioneered vicious attack ads." Adam Nagourney, Snooze Alarm:
The Year of the Yawn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at El.
Although the volume and vociferousness of attack ads may have increased
during the 1980s, they are not a new phenomenon. The first direct attack television
ad was used in 1952 by Estes Kefauver against Dwight Eisenhower, and "every
presidential election year since 1952 has had its share of negative television ads.
What is new is the pervasiveness of this technique." JOHNSON-CARTEE &
COPELAND, supra note 2, at 3.
10. See Sinclair, supra note 9, at 84. The turnout in 1960 was "a post-World War
II high of 64.5%." Mark J. Fenster, The Impact of Allowing Day of Registration
Voting on Turnout in U.S. from 1960 to 1992,22 AM. POL. Q. 74,74 (1994).
11. James W. Carey, The Press,Public Opinion, and Public Discourse,in PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 373, 374 (Theodore L. Glasser &
Charles T. Salmon eds., 1995). Communication and law scholar David S. Allen observes: "[W]e are confronted with an inactive public composed of individuals who
have become isolated from their political institutions. It is a public that has been separated from political life-a public that rarely enters the political arena and, when it
does, lives that political life through the institutional press." David S. Allen, The Supreme Court and the Creation of an (In)active Public Sphere, in FREEING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 93, 93 (David S.
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key role in keeping citizens away from voting booths.
Negative political advertisements create tension between First
Amendment 3 principles. On the one hand, they are on their face
political speech-"exp ression situated at the core of our First
Amendment values."' Political speech receives the most protection under the Supreme Court-created hierarchy of speech values.'5 Negative political ads, despite their tone, may also convey
substantive political information to the electorate, 6 and they serve
Allen & Robert Jensen eds., 1995).
12. In contrast to negative ads that may turn potential voters away from polling
places, social science research suggests that registration initiatives such as same-day
registration and motor-voter registration may increase voter turnout. See Staci L.
Rhine, Registration Reform and Turnout Change in the American States, 23 AM. POL.
Q. 409, 421-22 (1995). Rhine observes that "[m]otor-voter registration is found to
have a positive and significant effect on turnout." Id. at 419.
13. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to
state and local governments. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
14. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989). In an earlier case, the Supreme
Court observed that "[w]hatever differences may exist about interpretations of the
First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of
that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966).
15. Although political speech is at the core of First Amendment values, the
United States Supreme Court has accorded commercial speech less protection under
the First Amendment and has stripped obscene speech of all protection. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995) (providing a recent Supreme Court discussion of "core political speech"); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115
S. Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995) (noting that although the First Amendment protects commercial speech, "certain types of restrictions might be tolerated in the commercial
speech area because of the nature of such speech," and Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980), provides the relevant standard for testing the constitutionality of such restrictions); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (providing that it has been categorically settled by the Supreme
Court that "obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment").
Some commentators argue that today's political advertisements are really
nothing more than commercial speech that proposes a transaction with the potential
voter. Thirty-second televised spots trivialize political discourse. Law professors
Ronald Collins and David Skover observe that "[a]s politicians master the strategies
of advertising and entertainment programming, the gulf between important political
expression and pure amusement nearly vanishes." RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID
M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 17 (1996). This vanishing distinction supports the argument made in Part III of this Article that negative political ads should
not fall within the category of political speech that receives the most protection under the First Amendment. See discussion infra Part III.
16. For instance, Brown University's Darrell West observes in studying political
advertisements that "it is somewhat surprising to discover that the most substantive
appeals actually came in negative spots." WEST, supra note 3, at 51. Negative ads
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an informational function. Negative ads are perhaps an inevitable
part of the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 17 debate on political issues that a self-governing democracy prizes.
A self-governing democracy, however, also requires citizen
participation.' Voting is the most basic form of political participation. 9 Increasingly, however, as public-journalism practitioner
Davis Merritt observes, "public life-the way in which our democracy is expressed and experienced-is not going well."2 When
negative ads deter citizens from voting-when they demobilize the
electorate-they conflict with the principle of democratic selfgovernance that free speech exists to serve.
What should be done? Censoring or regulating negative political ads restricts political speech and violates the First Amendment. 22 Allowing such ads to proliferate, however, inhibits selfgoverning democracy, breeds cynicism, and, most importantly,
suppresses citizen participation at the voting booths.
Legal scholars have considered the constitutionality of re-23
stricting negative political advertisements on broadcast television.
"are more likely to have a policy-oriented content because campaigners need a clear

reason to attack the opponent." Id. at 52. Writing in The New York Times Magazine, John Tierney argues that "[o]n balance, poll-driven consultants and attack ads
have been good for democracy. If they have turned off many people, they have also

educated unprecedented numbers of voters, made politicians more accountable and
counteracted the biases of the media establishment." John Tierney, Why Negative

Ads are Goodfor Democracy, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1996, (Magazine), at 52.
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).

18. As University of Chicago constitutional law scholar Cass Sunstein states, "a
well-functioning democracy requires a degree of citizen participation." Cass Sunstein, Free Speech and Democracy, Keynote Address Before Sixth Annual Sympo-

sium of the Constitutional Law Resource Center, Drake University (Apr. 1, 1995), in
CHOOSING THE RIGHT PARADIGM: DOES FREE SPEECH INTERFERE WITH EFFORTS AT

EQUALITY OR VICE-VERSA? 25, 29 (1995).

19. As Alexander Meiklejohn wrote, "voting is merely the external expression of
a wide and diverse number of activities by means of which citizens attempt to meet
the responsibilities of making judgments, which that freedom to govern lays upon
them." Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr.
REV. 245,255.
20. DAVIS MERRITT, PUBLIC JOURNALISM & PUBLIC LIFE: WHY TELLING THE
NEWS ISNOT ENOUGH 3 (1995).

21. See ALEXANDER

MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL

POWERS OFTHE PEOPLE 27 (1948). Meiklejohn's premise was that "[t]he principle of
the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-

government." Id. at 27.
22. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995) ("when
a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny').
23. See, e.g., Rebecca Arbogast, Political Campaign Advertising and the First
Amendment: A Structural-FunctionalAnalysis of Proposed Reform, 23 AKRON L.
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Their articles focus on the erosion of substantive debate and deception that negative ads cause. For instance, Timothy Moran

notes that "many observers contend that the nature of political advertising impedes self-government by creating advertising that at
best lacks substance and at worst obscures and distorts crucial
issues." 24
These analyses are incomplete and, perhaps, misguided. They
fail to consider results obtained by new scientific research' that
reveals that negative advertising may actually suppress voter turnout. "The debate over campaign advertising to date has been
completely miscast. Focusing the debate on veracity or manipula-

tion or deception is just missing the point," argues Shanto Iyengar,
the UCLA professor partly responsible for the new findings."6
Restrictions on political ads must be considered anew in light
of this suppressed voter turnout. The harms to democratic selfgovernance legal scholars have considered may be real. Today,
however, another harm must be added to the equation that balances the free speech essential for a self-governing democracy
against the citizen participation that is the essence of a selfgoverning democracy-a democracy in which the "[r]ulers and
Decreased voter turnout proruled are the same individuals."
moted by political attack ads militates in favor of restricting the
content of political advertisements.
REV. 209 (1989); Lawrence M. Frankel, Stemming the "Sleaze": A Comprehensive
Approach to the Problems of Negative PoliticalAdvertising, 33 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 365 (1993); Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J.
663 (1992); Peter F. May, Note, State Regulation of Political BroadcastAdvertising:
Stemming the Tide of DeceptiveNegative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179 (1992).
24. Moran, supra note 23, at 663. Lawrence M. Frankel observes that the two
most serious harms caused by negative political advertisements on television are
"that (1) negative advertising may result in candidates winning elections that they
would not win in a world of completely accurate information, and that (2) negative
ads increase cynicism among the electorate." Frankel, supra note 23, at 379. Communication scholars Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell identify a
number of harms-harms other than the suppression of voter turnout-caused by
televised political ads. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & KARLYN KOHRS
CAMPBELL, THE INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE:

NEWS, ADVERTISING, POLITICS, AND

THE MASS MEDIA 335 (4th ed. 1997). They state that "[b]ecause ads are partisan
sources of information, they are poor sources of primary information. Ads suppress
information that would hurt their candidate; ads occasionally take evidence out of
context; ads occasionally invite false inferences." Id.
25. See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
26. Stephen Budiansky, Tune In, Turn Off, Drop Out, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 19, 1996, at 30, 30.
27. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 12.
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The argument for regulating televised political advertisements
is now stronger than ever. Not only do attack ads often denigrate
discourse and include false or misleading information that appeals
to voters' emotions rather than their rational thought processes,
but these ads keep voters away from the polls. Informed, rational
discourse and participation are necessary in a deliberative democracy.2 Regulation of political ads is essential to obfuscate the undesirable consequences of attack ads and, more importantly, to
preserve a deliberative democracy.
This Article takes an interdisciplinary approach in considering
whether to restrict the content of televised political advertisements. Part I articulates fundamental notions of democratic selfgovernance that underlie free speech protection in the United
States. Part II reports and critiques new data suggesting that
negative political ads decrease participation in democracy."
Part III considers how social science research about negative
ads affects legal arguments to restrict the content of televised political advertising. 3' Legal tests and challenges that content-based
and viewpoint-based regulations on political ads would face are
examined, and the Article suggests how social science data could
be used to provide legislative facts-facts that influence the creation and evolution of laws 3 2-to support new regulations on political ads under those legal tests.
Part III offers a somewhat radical argument to support regulations on televised negative political advertisements: that negative political ads are not, in fact, political speech. Rather, they are
anti-political speech-speech that turns people away from participation in democratic self-governance. They run counter to principles of deliberative and participatory democracy. Although
negative ads have informational value, there is a sharp difference
between promoting an informed public and promoting an active
public.13 Negative ads facilitate an inactive, detached public.
28. An informed public is only one reason for protecting speech in a selfgoverning democracy. If citizens do not act on the information, they have not participated in democracy. In brief, an informed citizenry serves the instrumental function of facilitating a telos of active, wise decision-making.
29. See infra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 78-146 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 14748 and accompanying text.
32. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 143 (3d ed. 1994).
33. See Allen, supra note 11, at 94 (observing that there is often "a confusion
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Negative political ads convey information at a very high price.
The new data suggest that negative ads decrease even the most
basic form of involvement in politics-voting.
Part III addresses a thorny public policy question: Does the
informational value of negative ads outweigh their detrimental effect
on participatory democracy? Parsed differently, does the goal of
promoting an informed public outweigh the goal of promoting an
active public? In considering this issue, note that the informational
value of negative ads is somewhat questionable. An informed
public is valuable only to the extent that the public acts on the information it possesses. 4 An informed but inactive public is a public lost, mimicking a group of spectators passively watching a
movie.
Ultimately, of course, the results of a few controlled experiments standing alone cannot change the law. As communication
scholars Jeremy Cohen and Timothy Gleason observe, "[flaw is
not lame without social science." 3 Public policy, reflected in public laws, is influenced by a multitude of factors, and social science
data may be ignored altogether. This Article, however, suggests
that recent social science data support a compelling government
interest in regulating the content of televised political ads.
I. THE ROLES OF FREE EXPRESSION IN DEMOCRATIC
SELF-GOVERNANCE

Free speech, writes First Amendment scholar Rodney A.
Smolla, is "an indispensable tool of self-governance in a democratic society." The United States Supreme Court's seminal decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan recognizes and adopts
this principle as part of constitutional jurisprudence. 8
between an informed public and an active public").
34. The United States Supreme Court recognizes that the free-press goal of promoting an informed public serves the larger goal of facilitating a politically active
public. The Court has observed: "[w]ithout the information provided by the press
most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or
to register opinions on the administration of government generally." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,492 (1975).
35. JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND LAW 110 (1990).
36.

RODNEY

A. SMOLLA,

FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY

12 (1992).

37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. Sullivan is "one of the defining cases of modern free speech law... [and] is
often understood to reflect the conception of freedom of expression advocated by
Alexander Meiklejohn-a conception of self-government, connected to the American principle of sovereignty." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 205-
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A. Sullivan and the Citizen-Critic
In March, 1964, against the backdrop of a growing civil rights
movement in the South and the use of state libel laws to stifle coverage in the national press,39 the Supreme Court handed down a
decision that would indelibly change the landscape of defamation
law.4" The Court held for the first time in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan that libel law "must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment."'" Prior to Sullivan, the Supreme Court had
never held that the First Amendment protections of speech and
press limit the reach of state libel laws designed to compensate
06 (1993).
39. Anthony Lewis, the Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times columnist, observes that Southern officials such as L.B. Sullivan, the plaintiff in the seminal libel
action against the New York Times, used the traditional libel actions as "a state political weapon to intimidate the press . . . [and] to scare the national press-

newspapers, magazines, the television networks-off the civil rights story."
ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

35 (1991).
At the time Sullivan was decided, defamation was "a tort of strict liability."
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 85 (1991). This
rule is particularly harsh for libel defendants. As media attorney Hal Fuson writes:
[I]f you were found to have spoken falsely, it did not matter that you had
made an innocent mistake. Thus, if you carefully had taken down facts obtained by phone from the public library, only to find that the librarian had
given you erroneous information, you still could be held liable for the resulting damage.
HAROLD W. FUSON, JR., TELLING IT ALL: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE EXERCISE OF

FREE SPEECH 23 (1995).
If a publication could be liable for any factual error, no matter how accidental or innocent, the aggregate monetary toll of plaintiff verdicts could eventually silence a lawsuit-wary press-a press fearful of the imposition of liability for its coverage of the civil rights movement. Rather than risk liability, the press could choose
the option of silence and self-censorship. This was the goal of local officials like L.B.
Sullivan.
The Sullivan Court recognized this problem. It observed that "[a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads
to... 'self-censorship."' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. The Supreme Court also noted
that the New York Times faced several lawsuits by Southern officials in addition to
Sullivan's defamation action. See id. at 278 n.18.
40. Defamation includes two separate torts: libel and slander. See JOHN D.
ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW:

LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN

102 (2d ed. 1997). Libel consists of "the publication of defamatory matter by
written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of
communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or
printed words." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). Slander, in contrast, traditionally is considered the oral or spoken form of defamation. See W.
MEDIA

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 785 (5th

ed. 1984).
41. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
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plaintiffs for reputational injury.42 Defamatory speech traditionally fell beyond the purview of First Amendment protection.
That changed with Sullivan when the Court adopted the actual
malice standard 43 to give the "citizen-critic of government"4 the
breathing room necessary to make accidental and uncalculated
factual errors when engaging in speech about public officials. The
actual malice standard, the Court stated, is a "privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticize as it is
the official's duty to administer., 45 Only if a defendant published a
defamatory statement about a public official with the knowledge
that it was false or with a reckless disregard for its veracity could
the defendant be held liable.46 The actual malice standard decreased the chances of self-censorship that existed under the common law rule of strict liability for libelous publications. 47
In adopting the actual malice standard, the Sullivan Court
recognized "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen."'' Amidst the hurly-burly of such debate, the Court reasoned that "erroneous statement is inevitable"49 and that it "must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.""'5 It held that
"[t]he right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public
42. See KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 272
(2d ed. 1996) (providing that "[b]efore 1964 and the New York Times decision, libel

suits were a matter of state law").
43. Actual malice is the publication of a defamatory falsehood "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 280. Reckless disregard for the truth requires "that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."

St. Amant v.

Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Actual malice is thus a subjective state of mind
requirement---"[m]ere negligence does not suffice." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,510 (1991).
The Supreme Court has observed that the term actual malice "is unfortu-

nately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will." HarteHanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 n.7 (1989).
44. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.

45. Id
46. See id. at 279-80.
47. See supra note 39 (discussing the rule of strict liability). Strict liability in tort
law is one of "three theories of redress [which] have provided the framework for
constructing a comprehensive basis of liability for unintended harm." ROBERT L.
RABIN, PERSPECrIVES ON TORT LAW 1 (4th ed. 1995).
48. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
49. Id. at 271.
50. Id. at 271-72.
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officials was.., a fundamental principle of the American form of
government.""1 The Sullivan Court "recognized that the First
Amendment was grounded on principles of self-government."5 2
B. The Meiklejohn-SullivanAxis
The Court's reasoning in Sullivan often follows philosopherscholar Alexander Meiklejohn's vision of democratic selfgovernance.53 In fact, since First Amendment scholar Harry
Kalven, Jr., linked the Court's reasoning to Meiklejohn, 4 legal
scholars have cited what Lee C. Bollinger calls an axiomatic
"Meiklejohn-Sullivan alliance."'5 Justice Brennan, who authored
Sullivan, solidified this link when he paid homage to Meiklejohn in
a Brown University lecture.5 6 Today, as University of Chicago
constitutional law scholar Cass R. Sunstein puts it, it is "a relatively uncontroversial working hypothesis, that the decision rested
on Professor Meiklejohn's conception of the first amendment. ' 's
Meiklejohn believed that "[t]he principle of the freedom of
speech springs from the necessities of the program of selfgovernment."" In a self-governing democracy, wise decisions
about public policy issues require that "all facts and interests relevant.., shall be fully and fairly presented. 5 9 The final aim or teSpeech about
of wise decisions."'
los of speech "is the voting
'
6
"matters of public interest deserves the most protection because
it fosters wise and informed decision making. For Meiklejohn, as
law professor Steven H. Shiffrin writes, "the Constitution's commitment to freedom of speech is nothing more than a reflection of
51. Id. at 275.
52. Mark D. Walton, The Public Figure Doctrine: A Reexamination of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., in Light of Lower Federal Court Public Figure Formulations,16
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 146 (1995).
53. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 SuP. CT.REV. 191,221.
54. See id.
55. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOcIETY 49 (1986). Bollinger observes
that the Meiklejohn-Sullivan alliance "provides the core structure around which
much First Amendment discourse and many opinions are built." Id.
56. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
57. Cass R. Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases,25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 898
(1984).
58. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 27.
59. Id. at 26.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 24.
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our commitment to self-government."6 2
Before going further, two points about Meiklejohn's theory
are critical. First, Meiklejohn emphasizes that voting-wise and
informed voting-is "the final aim"6 3 of free speech in a selfgoverning democracy. As he states, "the voters.., must be made
as wise as possible."' This concept is critical for considering
whether negative political ads merit regulation. The concept suggests that if speech either does not inform citizens or deters them
from voting, then such speech is subject to regulation.
A citizen's vote, as Meiklejohn would say in a later article, is
"the official expression of a self-governing man's judgment on issues of public policy."65 To the extent that citizens do not vote,
self-governing democracy erodes. Accordingly, if speech deters
citizens from voting, speech does not further democratic selfgovernance.
This leads to the second point. Meiklejohn did not believe
that all speech deserves protection. He observed that "[w]hat is
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said."' At first, this appears to open the
door for regulations on negative political advertisements. Arguably, negative advertisements are simply not worth saying. They do
not promote wise decision making and, in fact, they may deter
people from taking part in the decision making process.
This reading of Meiklejohn, however, must be tempered by his
admonition that citizens "may not be barred [from speaking] because their views are thought to be false or dangerous. No plan of
action shall be outlawed because someone in control thinks it unwise, unfair, un-American." 7 Read broadly, this suggests that
even if negative political ads are false or unfair they still deserve
protection.
Meiklejohn reinforces this point when addressing the defama62. STEVEN H. SHRIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 47 (1990).
63. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 26.
64. Id.
65. Alexander Meiklejohn, supra note 19, at 256.
66. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 26. Robert Post observes that this concept is
"one of Meiklejohn's most quoted aphorisms." ROBERT C.

POST,

CONSTITUTIONAL

(1995). Post suggests that
Meiklejohn and other legal scholars like Owen Fiss "would use governmental power
to censor speakers whose expression is deemed incompatible with the achievement
of a rich and informative public dialogue." Id. at 276.
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 270

67.

MEIKLEJOHN,

supra note 21, at 27.
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tion of public figures. He argues that if a "verbal attack is made in
order to show the unfitness of a candidate for governmental office,
the act is properly regarded as a citizen's participation in government. It is, therefore, protected by the First Amendment ...
Though private libel is subject to legislative control, political or
seditious libel is not."68
C. How Negative PoliticalAds Conflict with Democratic
Self-Governance
The Meiklejohnian vision of democratic self-governance
"seeks to promote, as a central democratic goal, reflective and deliberative debate about possible courses of action."69 Concomitant
with the principle of reflective deliberation is the principle of participation in self-governance. 0 Voting-the most basic form of
participation-should be the product of debate and dialogue. To
vote is to actively join in the decision-making process.
The following quartet of reasons support the argument that
negative political ads conflict with the principles of rational, deliberative debate and participation that are essential for democratic
self-governance:
1. Rational and deliberative debate is diminished by negative, 30-second, sound-bite advertisements that provide lit7
tle context and substantive information"
2. Rational and deliberative debate is diminished by negative, 30-second, sound-bite advertisements that appeal to
emotions ratherthan reason,72
68. Meiklejohn, supra note 19, at 259. These remarks were made prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan.

69. Cass R. Sunstein, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1762 (1995).

70. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, at 12 (providing that "speech is a means of participation [in governance], the vehicle through which individuals debate the issues of
the day, cast their votes, and actively join in the processes of decision-making that
shape the polity").

71. See Frankel, supra note 23, at 368 (stating that "[t]he more that negative ads
replace intelligent political debate over the issues, the more the democratic process

suffers").
72. See

JOHNSON-CARTEE

&

COPELAND,

supra note 2, at 276 (providing that

"[n]egative political advertising, as does all political advertising, often takes complex

issues and reduces them to emotion-laden snippets wrapped in stirring music and patriotic symbols. Such ads could be ripe for use by a would-be demagogue by appealing to the emotions and prejudices of people"). As Cass Sunstein observes,
"[d]emocracy by soundbite is hardly a perfect ideal." Sunstein, supra note 69, at
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3. Rational and deliberative debate is diminished by negative, 30-second, sound-bite advertisements that provide
false and misleadinginformation;and
4. Participationin democratic self-governance, as reflected
in voter turnout, is diminished by negative, 30-second,
sound-bite advertisements.
Negative ads not only diminish participation in democracy by
shrinking the electorate, but they disable a certain portion of that
electorate-nonpartisan, independent citizens.73 The data compiled by Ansolabehere and Iyengar reveal that negative ads "are
shrinking the electorate, especially the non-partisan electorate. As
the independents in the middle stop voting, the partisans at the extremes come to dominate electoral politics. It is the voice of this
increasingly small and increasingly polarized voting public that
representatives hear." 74
This is troubling. James Madison, one of the principle architects of the First Amendment, wrote in FederalistPaperNo. 39:
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow
that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people .... It
is essentialto such a government that it be derived from the
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it....*
It seems that when only half the people vote in presidential
elections, power is not derived from "the great body, 76 of the
people or society. There is nothing great about a bare majority of
eligible voters that does not include independent thinkers not
bound by party affiliation. That negative ads compound this
problem militates against their use and proliferation.
Balanced against these arguments for regulating negative ads
is the argument that they convey information that informs the
public, albeit a public less likely to vote as a result of the manner
and style in which that information is transmitted. 77 A rich judicial
tradition of protecting political speech weighs heavily on the side
1786.
73. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 148.
74. Id. at 10.
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 280-81 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1966) (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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of protecting negative political ads.
Negative political ads thus are subject to a tension between an
informed public and an active public. A self-governing democracy
in which the rulers and ruled are the same requires both an informed public and one that actively participates in the selfgoverning process. The "self' in "self-government" is meaningless
when only half of all eligible voters go to the polls.
Although negative political ads may convey information, they
also promote a politically inactive public. What informs the public
may harm the public, not simply because it is false or pollutes the
marketplace of ideas but because it hinders public involvement at
its most basic level-voting.
Before further analyzing the issue of regulating negative political ads, the next part of this Article reviews and critiques the recent data that suggest that negative political ads suppress voter
turnout. Before one can make a controversial and somewhat
paradoxical argument that political speech should be regulated in
the name of enhancing self-governance, one should scrutinize the
social science data that add fuel to that argument. In addition,
Part II summarizes prior social science research about other harms
caused by negative advertisements.
II. SUPPRESSING VOTER TURNOUT:
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

In December 1994 a group of MIT and UCLA political scientists published the results of a series of controlled experiments 7 on
the effects of campaign advertising tone on intention to vote.79
The same article also included the results of a systematic, aggregate-level content analysis"0 and a comparison of advertising tone
78. A controlled experiment is "a procedure for testing cause-and-effect rela-

tionships within a setting that permits maximum control over extraneous variation

and allows the experimenter to observe the effect of one variable on another in such
a way as to demonstrate that no other variable could have produced the same ef-

fect."

Bruce H. Westley, The Controlled Experiment, in RESEARCH METHODS IN
200, 204-05 (Guido H. Stempel & Bruce H. Westley eds.,
1989). For a primer on social science experiments and experimental methodology,
see EARL BABBLE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 236-59 (6th ed. 1992).
"Experiments are an excellent vehicle for the controlled testing of causal processes"
MASS COMMUNICATION

that allow researchers to test "the effect of an experimental stimulus on some de-

pendent variable through the pretesting and posttesting of experimental and control
groups." Id. at 258.
79. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 829.

80. In a content analysis, researchers examine and code the content of messages

1512

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1497

and voter turnout in the 1992 United States senatorial elections."s
This combination of experimental design and analysis of realworld data to analyze the same phenomenon is rare. Replicating
the experimental framework with real-world data enhances the external validity of the results. In 1995 two of the authors of the
American PoliticalScience Review article, MIT's Stephen Ansolabehere and UCLA's Shanto Iyengar, published an expanded version of their findings, Going Negative: How Attack Ads Shrink
and Polarizethe Electorate.8
The experimental findings and the analysis of the data from
the 1992 United States Senate races suggested the same result"negative campaigns tend to demobilize the electorate."" Lending
empirical support to a common sense hypothesis, Ansolabehere
and his colleagues found that "attack advertisements discourage
people from voting."" Their research also found that negative political ads decrease a sense of political efficacy, defined as the belief in the responsiveness of public officials and electoral institutions to the popular will. 6 Attacks produce "the highest drop in
political efficacy and in intentions to participate among nonpartisans."87
In terms of numbers and percentages, the experimental data
published in the American PoliticalScience Review suggest that:
[V]oting intention dropped by 5% when [experiment] participants were shown an attack advertisement in place of a
positive advertisement. Our aggregate-level replication of
the experimental results suggests that Senate turnout in
1992 was roughly 4% lower when the candidates waged
relatively negative campaigns. Since the scope of the experimental manipulations never exceeded a single advertisement, our estimates of the demobilizing effects of camor articles found in communication media such as magazines, newspapers, and television programs. See BABBIE, supra note 78, at 312-13. In the research Ansolabehere and his colleagues analyzed newspaper and magazine articles about the 1992
Senate campaigns and candidates' advertisements. Ansolabehere et al., supra note
4, at 833.
81. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 829.
82. External validity refers to "the generalizability of experimental findings to
the 'real' world."
BABBIE, supra note 78, at 249.
There is a danger that
"[e]xperimental findings may not reflect real life." Id. at 258.

83. See ANSOLABEHERE &

IYENGAR,

supra note 4.

84. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 833.
85. Id. at 834.

86. See id. at 835.
87. ANSOLABEHERE &

IYENGAR,

supra note 4, at 148.
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paign attacks may be conservative."
Ansolabehere and Iyengar estimate that, holding all other factors constant, 6.4 million more people would have voted in the
1992 senatorial elections had the tone of the campaigns been more
positive. 9 In a nutshell, the results of both the experimental and
nonexperimental procedures provide a damning indictment of
negative advertising.
Before accepting these data and conclusions, however, it is essential to review and critique the research methods and techniques
that led to those results. Section A, below, briefly describes the
experimental methodology and manipulations and provides an
overview of the researchers' analysis of the tone of thirty-four
United States Senate campaigns in 1992 and the voter turnout in
those elections. Section B points out possible weaknesses in the
research and methodology that mitigate the strength of the findings. Section C describes the results of other social science research on negative ads.
A. The Research
Ansolabehere and Iyengar focused their research on three potential effects of televised political advertisements: (1) distortion
of voter information;" (2) manigulation of voter choice; 9 and (3)
demobilization of voter turnout. This Article focuses on their research addressing the latter problem-the demobilizing effects of
negative political ads. Although Ansolabehere and Iyengar found
88. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 835.
89. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 108-09. The news from the
experiments about advertising tone and voting intentions is not all bad. Specifically,
positive advertisements can actually raise intentions to vote. See id. at 105.
90. The researchers found that "despite the typical advertisement's brevity and
superficial format, voters can and do learn from advertising, even on matters of substance such as the candidates' positions on the issues." Id. at 9. They observed that
the tone of the ads-whether positive or negative-does not influence "[h]ow much
voters learn about the candidates' positions." Id. at 51. Ansolabehere and Iyengar
found that "voters come away from positive and negative advertisements with about
the same level of issue information." Id. at 49.
91. Ansolabehere and Iyengar found that the manipulative powers of political
advertising were weak, observing instead that "exposure to advertising reinforces or
'awakens' latent partisan predispositions."
Id. at 10.
As they state,
"[a]dvertisements induce few Republicans to vote Democratic and few Democrats
to vote Republican." Id. at 64. They did find, however, that "Republican candidates
persuade their supporters more effectively with negative advertisements, while
Democrats tend to be more persuasive with positive appeals." Id. at 10.
92. See id. at 8.
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that political advertisements in general are informative and generally nonmanipulative, they observed that "negative advertisements, which account for approximately half of all campaign messages, are shrinking the electorate, especially the nonpartisan
electorate." Section 1 of Part A examines the experiments that
led to this conclusion. Section 2 analyzes the nonexperimental
data drawn from the 1992 senate races that support the finding
that negative ads cause demobilization.
1. The experiments
The overview below provides nontechnical synopsis of one
version-the one-ad design used to measure the impact of advertisement tone on voting intentions-of the experiments conducted
by Ansolabehere and his colleagues. 4 The overview is not a complete description of the series of experiments. Rather it is intended for legal scholars, untrained in social science methodology,
who are interested in a basic understanding of one of the ways in
which the researchers measured the impact of negative ads on
voting. The other parts of this section provide greater detail.
Readers of this article are strongly encouraged, however, both to
review Going Negative: How Attack Ads Shrink and Polarize the
95 for a complete understanding
Electorate
of the experimental
methodology and to reach their own conclusions about the internal
and external validity of the experiments.
a. overview
A controlled experiment is the "best-and very nearly onlyway of finding out what causes what."96 It involves a "direct test of
a hypothesis by observing the effect of one variable [the independent variablelon another [the dependent variable] under controlled
conditions."
In the experiments conducted by Ansolabehere and Iyengar,
for instance, "[t]he demobilization hypothesis predicts that exposure to negative advertising will lower the percentage of likely vot-

93. Id. at 10.
94. The overview describes the one-ad version of the experimental design. The
researchers also used a two-ad version not analyzed in this Article.
95. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4.
96. Westley, supra note 78, at 200.
97. Id. at 205.
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ers." 8 The independent variable9--the variable manipulated by
the researchers to see if it causes a change in the dependent variable-was a televised campaign ad.
The researchers
"manipulated" campaign ads by making a particular ad appear in
either a negative or positive tone. As Ansolabehere and Iyengar
state, the "essence of these experiments was that we could manipulate the tone of the experimental advertisement while keeping all
otherfeatures identical."'°
For instance, in one of the experiments, the researchers created two versions of an advertisement for former San Francisco
Mayor Dianne Feinstein, a candidate for the United States Senate. In both versions, the video track was the same. 02 Only the
words varied.' 3 In the positive version an announcer read the following:
For over 200 years the United States Senate has shaped the
future of America and the world. Today, California needs
honesty, compassion, and a voice for all the people in the
U.S. Senate. As Mayor of San Francisco, Dianne Feinstein
proposed new government ethics rules. She rejected large
campaign contributions from special interests. And Dianne Feinstein supportedtougher penalties on savings and
loan crooks.
California needs Dianne Feinstein in the U.S. Senate. °4
In contrast to the positive version of the advertisement for
Feinstein, the negative version attacked one of Feinstein's opponents in the Democratic primary, then-California State Controller
Gray Davis. The voice-over of the attack or negative version was:
For over 200 years the United States Senate has shaped the
future of America and the world. Today, California needs
98. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 832.

99. "A variable is a concept which can take more than one value; it is any distinguishable and distinguishing property which is of interest to the researcher." JAMES
A. ANDERSON, COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: ISSUES AND METHODS 91-92 (1987). In
a controlled experiment and, in terms of cause and effect, "the independent variable
is the cause and the dependent variable is the effect." BABBIE, supra note 78, at 238.
100. ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 102.
101. See id.
102. See id. The visuals for the one-ad design, like that used in the Feinstein ads,
"featured a panoramic view of the Capitol Building and the camera then zoomed in
to a closeup of an unoccupied desk inside a Senate office." Id. at 23.
103. See id. at 102-03. The researchers also used the same announcer for both the
positive and negative versions. See id. at 25.
104. Id. at 102.
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honesty, compassion, and a voice for all the people in the
U.S. Senate. As State Controller, Gray Davis opposed new
government ethics rules. He accepted large campaign contributions from special interests. And Gray Davis opposed
tougher penalties on savings and loan crooks.
California can't afford a politician like Gray Davis in the
U.S. Senate.M
The researchers also created similar ads for the Republican
primary race between John Seymour and William Dannemeyer
and for the other Democratic primary race for U.S. Senate in California between Barbara Boxer, Mel Levine, and Leo McCarthy."6
All of the experiments "took place during an actual campaign and
featured real candidates-Democrats and Republicans, liberals
and conservatives, males and females, incumbents and challengers-as the advertisers.""'
The researchers embedded the experimental advertisements
"in a fifteen-minute recording of a recent local evening newscast."'0 8 Participants in the one-ad experimental design watched
one of three versions of the news tapes-they were exposed to a
news tape that featured a negative political ad, a tape that included
a positive political ad, or one that did not include a political ad but
instead featured a commercial for a product. 9 Researchers randomly assigned participants to watch one of the three versions of
the local newscast." 0
Before watching the news tapes "subjects were given an instruction sheet informing them that the study concerned selective
perception of local newscasts. They then completed a short pretest
105. Id. at 103.
106. See id. at 23-25, 31-32. The complete series of experiments, which occurred
over a period of several years, also featured advertisements relating to other campaigns, including the 1990 California gubernatorial race between Dianne Feinstein
and Pete Wilson; the 1992 presidential election between Bill Clinton, George Bush,
and Ross Perot; and the 1993 race for mayor of Los Angeles between Richard Riordan and Michael Woo. See id. at 30. The issues and themes of the ads were relevant
or salient to the various campaigns. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 831.
In image ads
The researchers used both image and issue advertisements.
"candidates attempt to highlight their personal strengths." ANSOLABEHERE &
IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 34. In issue ads "candidates attempt to position themselves advantageously." Id.
107. ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 20.
108. Id. at 21.
109. See id. at 105. Subjects who watched the tape that did not include a political
advertisement were in what is known as a control group. See id.
110. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 837 n.4.
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questionnaire concerning their social background, media activities,
and political interest."" However, the pretest questionnaire did
not ask participants about their voting intentions-a potential
weakness in the research discussed later.12 In brief, there was no
3
pretest-posttest or before-after comparison of voting intentions."
Upon completion of the pretest questionnaire, the participants
watched the tapes in viewing rooms furnished with sofas and easy
chairs and replete with coffee and snacks.114 After watching the
tapes, subjects were given a posttest questionnaire that asked,
among other questions, whether they intended to vote in the upcoming election.'15 Researchers then hypothesized that advertising
tone influenced intention to vote. In addition to asking subjects
whether they intended to vote, the researchers asked whether, in
fact, subjects were registered to vote."' Participants were also
asked a series of questions about their confidence in the electoral
7
process and their own ability to influence the electoral process.1
The results, each of which are statistically significant," 8 are
striking. As Ansolabehere and Iyengar write:
Intentions to vote were 4.6 percentage points lower among
those who saw a negative advertisement than among those
who saw the positive version of the same spot. The percent
expressing confidence in government was 2.8 points lower
among those who saw the negative versions of the ads.
And the fraction who felt that their own vote counted were
5.2 points lower among those who saw the negative versions of the ads." 9
Importantly, Ansolabehere and Iyengar state that their find-

111. Id. at 831.
112. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
113. In a pretest-posttest design, subjects "serve as their own comparison group in
that their performance prior to treatment is compared with their performance after
the manipulation." ANDERSON, supra note 99, at 101.
114. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 831. The experiments were conducted at two sites in the Los Angeles area-one in West Los Angeles and one in the
Orange County town of Costa Mesa. See id.
115. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 103.
116. See id. at 177. The registration question was used to sort out "people who
lied about their intentions." Id.
117. See id. at 103.
118. The researchers state that "a one-sided t-test showed that advertising tone
significantly (at the .05 level) affected turnout." Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at
833.
119. ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 104.
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ing that negative advertisements lower intention to vote "held up
after we had controlled for a host of factors that social scientists
have found to predict participation-such as age, income, partisanship, and past participation.""'
A related discovery also merits mention. Ansolabehere and
Iyengar found that individuals who identify themselves as independents are particularly susceptible to the demobilizing effects of
negative advertisements. 2 1 Specifically, they found that among
Republicans and Democrats, "the drop in turnout produced by
negative advertising was 3 percentage points. Among nonpartiNegative ads
sans, the decline was an astounding 11 points."'
thus may polarize the electorate-the middle drops out and the
two extremes are left.
Subsections b and c below provide more detail about the experiments that lead to these results.
b. subjects
The participants in the experiments were not drawn from a
random sample of the Los Angeles area population.' 24 This is a
potential weakness of the experiment. According to the researchers, however, the sample population resembled that of the Los
Angeles area.-' A total of 2252 people participated in the one-ad
versions of the experiments. 26 Subjects were told about the true
120. Id.
121. See id. at 111.
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
123. A "simple random sample is a probability sample where each member of the
population has an equal chance of being selected." ANDERSON, supra note 99, at
151. The sample used by Ansolabehere and Iyengar was a convenience sample.
"[A] convenience sample is one which is readily available to the researcher. Convenience samples are usually 'prepackaged' groups such as classes or work teams. .. "
Id at 150. The problem with a convenience sample is that it "contains no evidence
that it informs us about any group other than itself." Id.
124. See ANSOLABOHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 29.
125. See id. at 29. The researchers state:
Across all the experiments, 46 percent of the participants were male, 52 percent were white, 24 percent were black. The median age was 34. Forty-eight
percent of the participants claimed affiliation with the Democratic party, 21
percent were Republicans, and 31 percent were independents. Thirty-nine
percent were college graduates, with the balance being evenly divided between high-school graduates and individuals with some college.
Id. (footnote omitted).
126. See id. at 181. The subjects, each of whom were paid $15 for participating in
the hour-long experiment, were recruited by the researchers through "advertising in
local newspapers, distributing flyers in shopping malls and other public venues, an-
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c. generalizability
A potential problem with all controlled experiments is that
artificial "laboratory" results will not explain how the phenome1
non in question actually works or occurs in non-lab situations.'
To reduce such problems and to enhance the external validity
of their one-advertisement experiments, the researchers used real
candidates, real campaigns, real newscasts, and actual political advertisement footage. 29 The setting for the experiment-"an informal, living room-like setting" furnished with a couch, easy
chairs, plants, and coffee-was designed to minimize the aura of a
research laboratory. 3
Finally, to increase the external validity of their experimental
findings, the researchers studied actual data from the 1992 United
States Senate campaigns and elections. 131 The next section describes the analysis of that data and the researchers' findings.
2. The 1992 senate campaigns and voter turnout
Ansolabehere and Iyengar did more than conduct experiments to gauge the impact of negative advertisements. They examined the tone of the thirty-four United States Senate campaigns
in 1992 and compared the tone of each campaign with its voter
turnout. 13 Using a systematic content analysis of news coverage of
the various campaigns, the researchers classified the campaigns
into one of three categories: positive tone, negative tone, or mixed
tone. 33
The findings? Ansolabehere and Iyengar report that:
The positive Senate campaigns in 1992 averaged high turnnouncing the studies in employee newsletters, soliciting the cooperation of office administrators, church pastors, restaurant managers, and others with access to large
groups of people, and telephoning names from voter registration lists." Ilat 29.
127. See id. at 21.
128. The danger of a controlled experiment is that "[o]ne risks the trade of a better study in a situation so contrived as to have little correspondence to the actual
settings to be explained." ANDERSON, supra note 99, at 100.
129. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 20-21.
130. Id. at 21.
131. See id. at 106.
132. See id.
133. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 833. For a complete discussion of
the coding of the campaigns, see ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 20106.
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out rates-57.0 percent of the voting-age population.
Turnout in the mixed-tone races was almost five percentage points lower, 52.4 percent, and turnout in the negative
races was down even further, to 49.7. These differences are
significant using conventional statistical tests, and they hold
up after controlling for the sense of civic duty in the state,
past rates of participation, the dollar volume of the campaign (amounts spent), the closeness of the race, and the
age and income of the electorate.1m
In addition to finding that turnout was lower in campaigns
dominated by negativism, Ansolabehere and Iyengar found that
negative campaigns increase a phenomenon called ballot rolloff."3 '
"Ballot rolloff occurs when people vote for offices high up on the
'
ticket, but ignore less important elections."136
For instance, an individual might cast a vote for President but ignore a senatorial
election. The researchers found that in "the positive Senate races
in 1992, 3.3 percent of those who voted for President did not vote
for Senator. In the negative senate races, the rate of ballot rolloff
was 6.0 percent." 137
B. Critique
Before adopting wholesale the conclusions of Ansolabehere
and Iyengar that televised negative ads should be restricted, we
should note several potential weaknesses in their methodology.
First, as noted above, the researchers did not draw participants from a random sample of individuals. 38 Individuals who
chose to participate in the experiment may be different from those
who did not. A nonprobability sample of individuals like that used
by Ansolabehere and Iyengar may not be representative of the
population of potential voters as a whole. "A sample of individuals from a population, if it is to provide useful descriptions of the
total population, must contain
essentially the same variations that
1 39
exist in the population.
Ansolabehere and Iyengar point out that their sample rea134. ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 108 (footnote omitted).
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 833.

138. In a random sample "each element has an equal chance of selection independent of any other event in the selection process." BABBLE, supra note 78, at 200.
139. Id. at 194.
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sonably represents-in terms of ethnicity and party affiliationthat of the Southern California voting-age population and that
they did not draw the sample from the usual pool of subjects for
such experiments, namely college sophomores.' 4° In addition, although the researchers did not select the subjects through a random sample, they randomly assigned the subjects to the different
experimental and control conditions, and the researchers controlled for background variables such as partisanship, prior voting
history, age, and education. 14' Random assignment to conditions
increases the likelihood that the groups are comparable.
A second possible weakness is the lack of a pretest measure of
participants' voting intentions. The researchers did not ask the
participants before watching the news tapes whether they intended
to vote. There was no measure, then, against which to compare
voting intentions after administration of the experiment. In other
words, the one-ad experiments featured an after-only design,' 42 in
which researchers were randomly assigned subjects to one of three
conditions, administered the stimulus, and then tested the subjects
for their voting intentions. This type of design is necessary, however, to mitigate the danger that a pretest measure of voting intentions might sensitize or alert the participants to the purpose of
the experiment.'43
Another possible weakness is that the experiment measured
participants' intentions to vote but not their actual voting behavior.
Based on these findings that negative ads suppress voter turnout,
one must believe that intentions about voting will probably translate into voting behavior. Attitudes and behaviors, however, are

140. See ANSOLABEHERE &

IYENGAR,

supra note 4, at 22,29.

141. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 4, at 837 n.4.
142. In an after-only design, "no measures [are] taken before the manipulation as

a basis for comparison with the measures taken after the manipulation." Westley,
supra note 78, at 198.

143. Sensitization poses a threat to the generalizability of an experiment, and one
must ask whether "the observed effect [would] also occur with persons who had not

been reactively measured before receiving the communication." Steven H. Chaffee
et al., Estimating the Magnitude of Threats to Validity of Information Campaign Effects, in INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS: BALANCING SOCIAL VALUES AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 285,288 (Charles T. Salmon ed., 1989).
As Bruce Westley states, an "advantage of after-only designs is that they
eliminate the possibility that the preinduction measure may have an undesirable effect on the postinduction measure, especially when they are measuring the same
thing to get a direct change measure, such as attitude change." Westley, supra note
78, at 204-05.
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not always the same.144 We do not know whether the participants
who said they intended to vote actually did vote, and we do not
know whether the participants who said they did not intend to vote
did not, in fact, vote.
Furthermore, Ansolabehere and Iyengar measured the effects
of short-term exposure to negative ads.' 45 The study did not look
at the long-term, cumulative effects of advertisements or follow up
with the participants to later monitor their voting behavior. However, if watching one negative advertisement can have the impact
on voting intentions found by Ansolabehere and Iyengar, it is
likely that the impact may be even greater when considering negative ads in the aggregate.
Another potential problem with the experiment is that the
messages created by the researchers to represent positive and
negative ads may not, in fact, represent those concepts. In other
words, the defining concepts of negative and positive ads may be
problematic. Likewise, there is a problem of message generalizability-will the research results generated with the specific
commercials used in the Ansolabehere and Iyengar experiments
generalize to other examples of supposedly negative ads?
"Generalization about a whole category of messages requires careful analysis of multiple members of the category." No two attack
ads in the real world are exactly the same. The question is
whether the findings gathered with the commercials created by
Ansolabehere and Iyengar would apply to other attack ads.
On the other hand, Ansolabehere and Iyengar went to great
lengths to control for message variables that may have confounded
with the independent variable under study-the tone of the ad.147
144. See generally Steven H. Chaffee & Connie Roser, Involvement and the Consistency of Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviors, 13 CoMM. RES. 373, 375 (1986)
(describing the relationship between knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors as
"variable and moderate, not constant and high").
145. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 4, at 21.
146. Sally Jackson & Scott Jacobs, GeneralizingAbout Messages: Suggestions for
Design and Analysis of Experiments, 9 HuM. COMM. RES. 169, 171 (1983). "Any
particular message chosen to represent any message category must be assumed to
differ from other members of the category in unknown and indefinitely numerous
ways." Id.
147. Michael D. Slater observes that a fundamental validity problem with
"message experiments is the risk that message stimuli do not cleanly operationalize
the variable under study-that is, some uncontrolled third variables are confounded
with the operationalization of the independent variable." Michael D. Slater, Use of
Message Stimuli in Mass CommunicationExperiments: A MethodologicalAssessment
and Discussion,68 JOURNALISM Q. 412,413 (1991).
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In other words, they took steps to isolate message tone-positive
or negative-as the only message characteristic that would change
between the positive and negative versions of the advertisements.
By keeping the other characteristics of the message unchanged,
they were able to focus their attention on the impact of advertising
tone on voting intentions.
This section has pointed out potential weaknesses with Ansolabehere and Iyengar's research. None of these problems is serious enough to discount the findings. The findings, as Part III argues below, provide powerful support for the argument that
negative political advertisements are not political speech.
III. RETHINKING REGULATION OF NEGATIVE POLITICAL ADS:
ATTACK ADS As DEMOCRACY DISABLING SPEECH

Negative political ads are not political speech deserving of
heightened First Amendment protection. Attack ads are better
categorized as democracy disablingspeech. These ads, which deter
participation in the political process, should receive only the intermediate protection afforded commercial speech.
A. The CurrentState of the Law
Televised campaign advertisements, no matter how vicious or
defamatory, currently receive protection under the First Amendment as political expression4s Any law that singles out a particular type of content or topic of speech for regulation is subject to
what courts call the strict scrutiny standard of review. 149 The
United States Supreme Court observed in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC5' that courts must "apply the most exacting
scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose dif-

148. For instance, under the equal opportunities provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, broadcast licensees "have no power of censorship over the material broadcast" by legally qualified candidates for public office. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1994).
149. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (using the term "strict scrutiny" to describe the standard of review
for content-based regulations). "[L]aws that by their terms distinguish favored
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). In addition,
the United States Supreme Court has held that "even a regulation neutral on its face
may be content based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the
message it conveys." Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
150. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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ferential burdens upon speech because of its content.''
The
Court stated in Sable Communications,Inc. v. FCC52 that the government may "regulate the content of constitutionally protected
the
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses
53
interest.'
articulated
the
further
to
means
least restrictive
The application of the strict scrutiny standard varies depending on the medium.'-4 The Court observed in Turner that "our
cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast
speakers than of speakers in other media."'' 5 This stems in part
56 and the "unique physical
from the spectrum scarcity rationale' 57
medium.'
limitations of the broadcast
The Federal Communications Commission is charged with ensuring that broadcasters act on behalf of "the public interest, convenience, and necessity.""' Under this power and in light of spectrum scarcity, the United States Supreme Court has upheld limited
content restraints and the imposition of affirmative obligations on
broadcast licensees. 5 9 For instance, in Red Lion BroadcastingCo.
v. FCC'60 the Court upheld the validity of the so-called Fairness
Doctrine' 6' despite its intrusion on the editorial autonomy of

151. Id. at 642.
152. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
153. Id. at 126. Under this standard, "[iut is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those
ends." Id.
154. As one federal appellate court recently observed:
[R]adio and television broadcasts may properly be subject to different-and
often more restrictive-regulation than is permissible for other media under
the First Amendment. While we apply strict scrutiny to [content-based]
regulations of this kind regardless of the medium affected by them, our assessment of whether... [a law] survives that scrutiny must necessarily take
into account the unique context of the broadcast medium.
Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 660.
155. Turner,512 U.S. at 637.
156. There are more people who wish to broadcast than frequencies available in
the electromagnetic spectrum. See id. at 637-38. This "inherent physical limitation
on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast medium ... require[s] some
adjustment in traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the Government to
place limited content restraints, and impose certain affirmative obligations, on
broadcast licensees." Id. at 638.
157. Id. at 637.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
159. See Turner,512 U.S. at 638.
160. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
161. The Fairness Doctrine requires "that discussion of public issues be presented
on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage."
Id. at 369.
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broadcast licensees. 6 2 In 1995 in Action for Children's Television
v. FCC,'63 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the channeling of indecent speech to so-called
safe-harbor time periods. 64
Political speech, as a category of speech, receives the most
protection under the First Amendment. 16s The Supreme Court has
held that it "occupies the core of the protection afforded by the
First Amendment."'66 Thus, it is clear that any restriction on political expression faces extraordinarily high obstacles before its
constitutionality is secure. Moreover, a regulation that allows
"positive" televised political advertisements but that restricts
"negative" ones may face even tougher scrutiny as a viewpointbased regulation.' 67 The FCC may, however, make regulations that
serve the public interest and restrict content in the broadcast medium to serve the public interest)'
Section B below argues that one mechanism for regulating
negative political ads is simply not to define them as political
speech. Instead, they may be categorized as commercial speech
and thus more readily subjected to government regulation.
B. Negative PoliticalAds: Democracy DisablingSpeech
In a 1992 law journal article on format restrictions for televised political advertising, legal scholar Timothy J. Moran argues
that "[t]here is no legitimate government interest in suppressing or
inhibiting negative [political] advertising.', 169 Moran asserts, without the benefit of the extensive research conducted by Ansolabehere and Iyengar 70 that "there is no indication that negative advertising per se is less informative or provides a less-meaningful

162. See id. at 400-01.
163. 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).

164. See id. at 656.

165. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
166. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (1995). The Court
observed that when "a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest." Id. at 1519.
167. "The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints .... The Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents." American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,325 (7th Cir. 1985).
168. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
169. Moran, supra note 23, at 697.
170. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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discussion of issues than positive advertising."17 '
Moran's article misses the point. There is a legitimate interest-in fact, there is a compelling interest-in regulating negative
ads. It has nothing do with the information value of negative ads,
however. Instead, it has everything to do with their ability to disable democracy-to turn people away from political participation.
To narrowly focus on the information value is to ignore the fact
that information only serves a valuable purpose if the recipient
acts upon the message.
An informed public is not the final end of protecting political
expression. Rather, information is protected only so that it may
enable individuals to participate in a wise and informed manner in
a self-governing democracy. Negative political ads, the Ansolabehere and Iyengar data suggest, may provide information but they
deter political participation.
In her 1989 law journal article on political campaign advertising, Rebecca Arbogast emphasizes that "[r]ich public debate involves not only the quantity and nature of the information presented to the electorate, but an element of participation in the
process as well. ' ' 71 ' A major "challenge to the continued vitality of
a democracy then is to facilitate [potential voters'] participation
and enhance their sense of engagement in the process."' 7a
Illinois State University Professor David S. Allen emphasizes
that courts often conflate an informed public and an active public.' 74 An informed public is not the same construct as an active
public. An informed public that does nothing with the information
it possesses-even if it is the highest quality information-serves
little value in a self-governing democracy.
NBC television news anchor Tom Brokaw summarized the
situation well after the 1996 presidential election. "If we don't sell
hard the idea of participation, we will be left with a system be171. Moran, supra note 23, at 697.
172. Arbogast, supra note 23, at 211.
173. Id.

174. See Allen, supra note 11, at 94. The confusion extends beyond the law.
Communication researchers Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton identified in
1948 a phenomenon that they dubbed the narcotizing dysfunction. See WERNER J.
ORIGINS,
COMMUNICATION THEORIES:
METHODS, AND USES INTHE MASS MEDIA 300 (3d ed. 1992). This phenomenon sugSEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR.,

gests that "[tjhe interested and informed individual may know about the problems of
the society without recognizing that he or she has failed to make decisions and do
something about them." Id. In other words, mass media audience members may
confuse being informed about a subject with taking action about it.
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holden only to the highly motivated, very narrowly defined special
interests whose only interest is advancing their own causes. 1 75
This captures the admonition of James Madison, primary architect
of the First Amendment, that "[iut is essential to such a
[democratic] government that it be derived from the great body of
not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored
the society,
,1 76
class.
This Article does not argue that negative political ads do not
convey information of substance that might inform the potential
electorate. Instead, it asks: Does the informationalvalue of negative ads outweigh their detrimental affect on participatory democracy? This Article answers this query in the negative.
Speech that harms political participation is difficult to call political speech. If anything, it is anti-political speech. It disables
democracy and is counter-productive to a more inclusive, participatory culture in which the public sphere should expand rather
than contract. Negative political ads appear to be this kind of
speech.1 n Simply because their subject matter concerns politics
does not mean that they have value in a self-governing democracy.
The FCC, as noted above, is charged with regulating broadcast
content in the public interest. 178 The FCC must consider the public
interest-the collective-level general welfare of society-to provide some room for legal maneuvering to reduce speech that
harms participation in democracy. Red Lion is precedent for the
view that the audience's interest must sometimes take priority over
the interests of the speakers-be the speakers broadcast licensees
or political candidates-in the broadcast medium.179 As the Supreme Court observed in that case, "[i]t is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 8 ' It is time to consider whether the public interest entails
sacrificing some forms of political speech-specifically, televised
negative political ads-to better serve the interests of the audience. As members of a self-governing democracy, all citizens have
175. Bored to the Bone, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1996, at 38, 40.
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 281 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1966) (second emphasis added).
177. Future replications of the Ansolabehere and Iyengar experiments may further increase the validity of this proposition if the results produced resemble the current findings.
178. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
180. Id.
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a compelling interest in increasing political participation. Supreme
Court decisions, as Justice Breyer recently observed, "have not left
Congress or the States powerless to address the most serious
problems."'' 1
Televised negative political ads pose the most serious problems to our self-governing democracy. They are not political
speech but democracy-disabling speech. They are more akin to
commercial speech designed to sell a product than to speech that
facilitates democratic self-governance. The sponsoring candidate
is the product. As Collins and Skover observe, "[t]he concept of
the voter as consumer necessarily leads to the concept of the politician as seller."' 1
Commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment,
but not to the extent of political speech.'83 In Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission8"4 the United States
Supreme Court held that:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary .... 5
Under this standard, negative political ads that are not false or
misleading receive protection under the First Amendment but may
be regulated if the government offers a substantial interest. The
interest in promoting participation in a self-governing democracy
in which less than one-half of the voting-age public casts a ballot is
an interest of a compelling nature. Restricting negative political
ads-as opposed to all political advertisements-may provide the
necessary remedy for serving that interest. Such a remedy does
181. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2384 (1996) (citations omitted).

182. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 15, at 94. Collins and Skover observe that
"[a]dvertising-agency professionals serve as 'media consultants' to the candidates
and orchestrate elections as if they were mass-marketing campaigns. All three of the
major candidates in the 1992 presidential election race turned to Madison Avenue
gurus." Id. at 94-95.
183. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down a state statute that prohibited price advertising of drugs by pharmacists).
184. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
185. Id. at 566.
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not prohibit all televised campaign ads, but only those that attack
an opponent.
A problem, of course, with such a regulation is a potential
void-for-vagueness challenge based on ambiguous definitions of
concepts like "negative ads" or "attack ads." To survive a vagueness challenge, a law must "give the person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" and
"provide explicit standards for those who apply [the law]."' 86
Vague laws, as Stanford University constitutional law scholar
Kathleen Sullivan observes, are troublesome because they "pose a
as
terrible danger of promoting self-censorship, which can be just 17
chilling of protected speech as formal government regulation is."'
Advertisements that criticize or attack a political opponent
based either on a personal characteristic or a policy position would
fall within the scope of negative political ads. Drafting a more
precise definition is beyond the scope of this Article. The purposes of this Article, instead, are to suggest-using social science
evidence-that negative political ads are problematic in a selfgoverning democracy and to argue that they should not be afforded absolute protection as political expression because they
demobilize potential voters.
Is this Article's suggestion that negative political ads must be
restricted because they represent democracy-disabling speech a
case of, as the United States Supreme Court once stated,
"burn[ing] the house to roast the pig"?' Does it sacrifice the informational value of negative political ads at the altar of political
participation? These are questions about which reasonable legal
minds may disagree. What would be more troubling than a disagreement, however, would be if no one stopped to ask what can be
done to enhance participation in the democratic process in an era
of pervasive cynicism in which people drop out of politics as if it
were some elective course in college.
If negative political ads do suppress voter turnout, as the data
described herein suggest, then a logical starting point is to consider
their regulation.

186. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
187. Richard C. Reuben, Pulling the Plug on TV Violence, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1994,
at 39, 41.
188. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Using social science research, this Article offers an argument
that negative political ads must be restricted because they disable
democracy and suppress voter turnout. Public policy judgments
must take into account solid social science research when problems
that strike at the core of what it means to live in a self-governing
democracy lie in the balance between inaction and regulatory reform.
Much of the argument herein contradicts traditional thinking
about political expression. Speech about politics seems on its face
like political expression. This Article, in fact, agrees that speech
that serves democratic self-governance must be protected. Speech
about politics, however, is not the same thing as speech that serves
politics. Negative political ads do not serve democratic selfgovernance-they inhibit it. They are not political expression to
the extent one uses that term to define speech in the public interest that promotes the collective welfare. 8 Although the topic may
be about politics, the message conveyed is debilitating to participatory democracy.
Alexander Meiklejohn, as noted in Part I of this Article, suggested that the final aim of free speech is "the voting of wise deciUnfortunately, negative campaign ads may prevent the
sions.
voting of wise decisions. This is not because the information the
ads contain may be false and thus cause citizens to vote incorrectly. Negative political ads prevent the voting of wise decisions
simply because they deter people from even taking the steps necessary to cast a ballot. An informed but inactive public is not selfgoverning.

189. For instance, Meiklejohn defines political speech as "matters of public interest-roads, schools, poorhouses, health, external defense, and the like." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 24.
190. Id. at 26.

